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Abstract: 
The present study analyzes the extent of voluntarily disclosed information about 
intangible resources, in the annual report of companies from Spain’s capital 
market, as well as the possibility of there being a correlation between that 
disclosure and the effective profitability of the stock. In methodological terms, the 
present research has used semiotic analysis, in order to construe indicators and 
indexes, and the technique of logistic regression, to analyze the probability of the 
implication between disclosure and stock profitability. The considerations that were 
established go against the assumption that the extent of voluntarily disclosed 
information results in greater stock profitability, in the year following the 
publication of the company’s annual report, when results are found to be higher 
than average. On the other hand, the analysis presents statistically meaningful 
results, recognizing the probability of a decrease in stock profitability, in the year 
following the publication of information. 
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1. Introduction  
The consequences of voluntarily disclosing information about intangible resources 
over the cost of capital and, therefore, of the effective profitability of stock is a 
theme that has not been, so far, the object of many studies, although it is of great 
importance for the capital market and for the institutions that regulate it. The 
difficulty of measuring the extent of voluntarily disclosed information about 
intangible resources, as well as the limitations found in treating them by using 
accounting tools restrains, to a great extent, the development of empirical studies. 
The expression intangible resources is used here to mean the same as knowledge 
and intellectual capital. They are resources that generate value, with no physical 
substance, generated through material or financial investment, through innovation 
and peculiar organizational designs for the management of human resources. The 
expression intangible resources has been chosen instead of immaterial active, 
because the latter demands a treatment with accounting techniques. 
In the attempt to contribute to the development of the field, the present research 
analyzes the probability of finding a correlation between the extent of voluntarily 
disclosed information about intangible resources, in the annual report of 2002, and 
the effective profitability of stock, in the following year. The sample consists of 91 
non-financial companies, listed in the Bolsa de Madrid. 
In methodological terms, the present research has used of techniques from 
semiotic analysis. Semiotic is “sciences general of all of the systems of signs” 
(Coelho Netto, 1990: 17). In order to construe indicators and indexes, this made it 
possible to identify the extent of voluntarily disclosed information about intangible 
resources. In order to analyze the probability of finding a correlation between the 
extent of voluntarily disclosed information about intangible resources and stock 
profitability, the technique of logistic regression analysis has been used. 
The results go against the assumption that the extent of voluntarily disclosed 
information about intangible resources means greater stock profitability in the year 
following the publication of the annual report of the companies. On the other hand, 
the analysis presents statistically meaningful results, recognizing the probability of 
there being a decrease in profitability of stock in the year following the disclosure 
of information on tangible resources. 
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The present article is structured in five parts. After the introduction, the theoretical 
assumptions, the research problem, the objective of the research, and the 
formulation of the hypothesis, are presented. After that the methodology used is 
described, identifying the sample, the data sources and the analysis technique, as 
well as the models, used in the research. Moreover, the variables are described. In 
the end, the results are analyzed and some possible conclusions are discussed. 
2. Review of previous work and development of a hypothesis 
On the one hand, neoclassic economic theory maintains that the market works in 
perfect competition. From another theoretical perspective, the market presents 
imperfections, such as the tendency to concentration, uncertainty and risk, 
unbalanced income distribution and asymmetrical information (Arrow, 1963). This 
point of view recognizes the company in its structural complexity, as an 
organization comprising a contact network (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Such an 
organization is defined as developing activities aiming at the procurement of gain, 
established by resources and capacities: tangible and intangible, aligned by the 
responsibilities of the involved parts in the contracts that sustain it. When it comes 
to private companies, the main objective is the maximization of its value (Coase, 
1971; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Hughes, 1986; Core, 2001; Williamson, 2002b; 
Suárez, 2003; Brealey & Myers, 2005; Copeland et al., 2005; Roos et al., 2005), 
represented by capital gains and dividend gains (Copeland et al., 2005), identified 
by the effective profitability of the company’s stock, the investor’s main objective. 
In the economic studies reviewed, it has been observed that intangible resources 
are an important differential for the maximization of the company’s value. For this 
reason, a choice has been made to analyze the disclosure of representative 
information on intangible resources. Intangible actives come from the theory of 
resources and capabilities. Resources are “all activities, capacities, organizational 
processes, company attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by the 
company, capacitating it to create and implement strategies to improve efficiency 
and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991: 101). In other words, the resources of a 
company may be tangible (financial and physical), human (abilities and knowledge, 
capacity for communication and collaboration and motivation) and intangible 
(technology, reputation and culture). (Habbershon & Williams 1999; Grant, 2005). 
When the value of information is recognized, this becomes intangible capital, 
integrating the resources of a company. Since in an environment of uncertainty 
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information is seen as a product, in an economic context it becomes value (Arrow, 
1962). 
The point of departure is the principle that investors are essentially capital 
providers, not the owners of a company, to the extent that stockholders have 
stock, not the whole corporation (Demsetz, 1967). The investor is committed to 
the capital, providing resources for the working of the company, whereas the 
manager administrates such resources, choosing their destination within the 
organization. Therefore, the administrator, because he retains both control and 
established decision-making power within a previously agreed upon time 
framework, determines the application of those resources, according to his or her 
parameters of choice, establishing new economic conditions for the organization. 
As stockholders or investors are not informed about the new economic conditions, 
there arises an informational asymmetry between them and the manager. 
Information is one of the most important factors for market efficiency. Asymmetric 
information, inherent to exchange relations, causes market inefficiency, giving 
room for the possibility of greater gain for some and lesser gains for others 
(Akerlof, 1970). 
The existence of asymmetry of information would suggest the appearance of 
problems related to adverse selection and moral risk. The problem of adverse 
selection arises before the contract is signed, and occurs whenever one of the 
parties withholds private information. The other party is then subject to adverse 
selection, to the extent that it does not have the information necessary for a better 
assessment of the object of interchange. The problem of adverse selection (may) 
arise whenever a contractor is free to buy (or not), to choose the amount of the 
purchase, and continue the interchange or to abandon the transaction (Akerlof, 
1970), as in the case of stock acquisition in the capital market. The problem is 
minimized by the reduction of the asymmetry of information, made possible by its 
disclosure. 
In contrast to the problem of adverse selection, moral risk appears after the 
signing of the contract, and means uncertainty increased by the possibility of 
negative results (risks) with the behavior (immoral problematic) between the 
parties of a contract. This arises when the action of the agent is not verifiable 
(Arrow, 1963). In the contracts of the capital market, it means the possibility of 
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the company’s administration to choose to pursue other objectives (whether they 
be personal or not) instead of those held by external stockholders. Whereas 
stockholders aim at the maximization of the company’s value, administrators may 
focus on protecting their own interests, such as personal income, power, security, 
professional recognition, continued education of the staff, among others (Brealey & 
Myers, 2005), as well as establishing a different position toward the problem of 
risk. 
In theory, those problems may create transactional costs, related to the increase of 
investment risks, resulting in capital costs, mainly of companies with greater 
financing needs; the under- or over-valuation of stock, especially the intangible 
resource-intensive ones; the use of privileged information, allowing the 
manipulation of information; benefiting the big stockholders over the small ones; 
the increase in volatility and decrease in stock liquidity (Firth, 1984; Chow & Wong-
Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1989; Christopher & Hassan, 1995; Hossain et al., 1995; 
Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Aboody & Lev, 2000; Leventis & Weetman, 2000; 
Watson et al., 2002; Nagar et al., 2003; Firer & Williams, 2006). 
The recognition of the existence of asymmetry of information could generate 
reactive behavior both by investors and stockholders, as well as by administrators. 
An investor’s reaction could be demanding greater capital gains, since he or she 
does not have the information allowing better assessment of the risk of the 
investment, which would result in transactional costs. That is due to the fact that 
the cost of information is the main component of transactional costs (Coase, 
1998). In an environment of uncertainty, information is a product, since in the 
economic context it becomes economic value, in the sense that anyone who has 
information may obtain greater gains (Arrow, 1962). 
On the other hand, to the extent that an administrator deems this behavior as 
possible, he or she may voluntarily disclose information, aiming at establishing a 
trust relationship with the stockholders or investors (Botosan, 1997; Marr, 2005), 
altering the investors’ perception about the risk of the active’s return, and 
promoting greater liquidity in the stock market (Copeland & Galai, 1983; Glosten & 
Milgrom, 1985; Diamante & Verrecchia, 1991; Botosan, 1997; Healy & Palepu, 
1999; Lambert et al., 2006). Information disclosure may belong to one of three 
categories (Healy & Palepu 1999): obligatory financial demonstration; voluntary 
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disclosure by administrators and information from third parties. However, 
disclosure is normally referred to as being either compulsory or voluntary, since 
information from third parties is mediated by analysts or journalists. If on the one 
hand compulsory disclosure is regulated by legislation and by the rules of 
accounting – formal institutions, voluntary disclosure depends on the motivations 
of the company’s administrators. Thus, all information disclosed by initiative of the 
company’s directors, unless it is compulsory, due to external regulation, is 
considered, basically, as voluntary. Since compulsorily disclosed information is the 
same for all companies within a market, we may assume that it is voluntarily 
disclosed information that makes the difference among companies. Thus, the 
disclosure of information may mean gains through the expansion of liquidity, lesser 
volatility, reduction of costs of capital and, consequently, greater profitability of 
stock in the capital market. 
However, there is no consensus concerning information disclosure when it comes to 
stating that this would bring about, necessarily, the procurement of gains. Another 
theoretical perspective departs from the assumption that disclosure of information 
establishes costs for the company (Verrecchia, 1983; Dye, 1986; Fishman & 
Hagerty, 1988; Wagenhofer, 1990; Darrough & Stoughton, 1990; Lev, 1992; King 
& Wallin, 1995; Camfferman, 1997; Depoers, 2000; Williams, 2001; Vergauwen & 
Alem, 2005). Those are divided into direct and indirect costs. Direct costs are the 
effort to process and spread information. In other words, those are the costs 
established by material and human values needed for the activity of identification, 
systematization and publication of information. Indirect costs are related to three 
situations: (1) negative impact, in the perception of investors, of disclosed 
information; (2) litigation costs; (3) loss of competitive advantages, due to the 
disclosure of certain pieces of information making it possible for competitors to 
react strategically, promoting a decline in the profitability of stock. The 
representation of the consequences of the voluntary disclosure of information, 
following different theoretical perspectives, is summarized in Figure 1. 
Therefore, the decision to voluntarily disclose information might have different 
consequences, depending on the theoretical perspective one adopts. This is proof 
enough of the difficulties institutions have to face when they have to establish 
norms aiming at obtaining a smooth market performance, as well as how difficult it 
is for administrators to establish disclosure policies, which seems to justify the 
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relevance of the present research. Moreover, a mention may be made of the 
limited amount of empirical research about the implications of the extent to which 
one has decided to voluntarily disclose information (such as the ones carried out by 
Botosan, 1997; Sengupta, 1998; Richardson & Welter, 2001; Botosan & Plumlee, 
2002; Hail, 2002; Gietzmann, 2003), analyzing both compulsorily and voluntarily 
disclosed information, going farther than the analysis of merely tangible resources. 
Resources are “all activities, capacities, organizational processes, company 
attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by the company, capacitating it 
to create and implement strategies to improve efficiency and effectiveness” 
(Barney 1991: 101). In other words, the resources of a company may be tangible - 
financial and physical; human - abilities and knowledge, capacity for 
communication and collaboration and motivation and intangible - technology, 
reputation and culture (Habbershon & Williams 1999; Grant 2005). This 
information is considered as strategic, because it is a competitive differential, 
which maximizes the company’s value. 
 
+ + ELABORATION COSTS 
+ LITIGATION  
- COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES 
- STOCK PROFITABILITY 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
+ LIQUIDITY 
- VOLATILITY 
- CAPITAL COST  
+ STOCK PROFITABILITY 
+ INFORMATION DISCLOSURE  
 
 
Figure 1: Consequences of information disclosure 
 
 
 
©© Intangible Capital, 2009 – 5(1): 1-32 – ISSN: 1697-9818 
doi: 10.3926/ic.2008.v5n1.p1-32  
 
Voluntary disclosure of intangible resources and stock profitability 8 
C.B. Macagnan 
 
It is necessary to know the consequences, both private and social, of disclosing 
information about intangible resources (Lev, 1997; Fields et al., 2001). In January 
2002, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) created a committee 
aiming at discussing the implications related to those topics: the disclosure of 
information and intangible actives. Among different arguments, the commission 
highlights a concern toward investigating: “What are the costs and benefits of 
disclosing information about intangible actives?” (Financial Accounting Standards 
Committee, 2003: 183) There is very little evidence about the reduction of capital 
costs from the disclosure of information (Lev, 2003). 
Therefore, the issue that identifies the problematic of information disclosure 
concerning intangible resources over stock profitability is: “Is there a relationship 
between the extent of voluntarily disclosed information and the profitability of a 
company’s stock, in the following year?” So, the hypothesis to be tested is: 
Ho: There is a positive relationship between the voluntary disclosure of information 
and the effective profitability of stock obtained in the following year.  
Thus, this research aims at verifying the investors’ behavior, from the perspective 
of the identification of the communicative behavior of the administrator, made 
possible by the analysis of the probability of there being an implication between the 
extents of the disclosure of information on intangible resources. 
3. Methodology 
Characterization of the sampling 
The population analyzed consists of 110 individuals, that they integrate the 
Mercado Continuo, whereas the sample comprises 91 companies with stock on the 
Spanish market, as seen in Appendix 1. Most companies excluded from the 
sampling belong to the financial sector (e.g. banks, insurance companies and 
state-owned savings banks). The banks and insurance companies follow an 
international normative orientation different from the companies of other 
segments, for this reason they were excluded of the sample. Only seven companies 
have been excluded due to insufficient information. All companies in the sampling 
belong to the general index of the Bolsa de Madrid; they also took part in IBEX 35 
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in 2002. This number of companies represents 83% of the population, which 
ensures the representational dimension of the sample. 
An important feature of the sampling is its balance, in terms of representation of 
the four market sector to which the companies analyzed belong. The sectors are: 
(1) basic industry, including the extractive industry, steel metallurgy, and energy 
and metal transformation. Those are large-scale companies, usually with some kind 
of state intervention (price regulations or subventions), performing their activities 
focused on basic products for the economy; (2) manufacturing industry, comprising 
companies that manufacture goods, usually targeted at consumers; (3) the 
building industry, including constructors, cement producers and furniture factories; 
(4) commerce, services and transportation, comprising companies from the fields 
of commerce, services in general and transport. The manufacturing sector is the 
best represented, with 28 companies (30% of the total of the sample); the building 
sector is the least present in the sampling, with 19 companies (20% of the total of 
the sampling). 
Data sources 
The development of this research involved searching for data from different 
sources. Among them, annual company reports may be mentioned, as well as 
databases from SABI (the Iberian System of Balance Sheet Analysis), electronic 
pages, Internet sites, Bolsa de Madrid, CNMV (the National Committee of the Stock 
Market), the Spanish Stock Market Society (Infobolsa), the Barcelona Stock Market 
and the databases from ABI/Inform Global, Business Source Premier, and 
ECOMLIT, apart from work documents presented in Congresses and published on 
the Internet. This resulted in two different kinds of data: primary and secondary 
sources. 
The annual reports, concerning 2002, published on a website, of companies 
included in the sampling, are the primary source of data. The annual report has 
been chosen because it is the most usual communication medium used by 
companies (Camfferman, 1997). Those data were used to constitute the 
explanatory variables which identified the extent of information disclosure on 
intangible resources. 
 
©© Intangible Capital, 2009 – 5(1): 1-32 – ISSN: 1697-9818 
doi: 10.3926/ic.2008.v5n1.p1-32  
 
Voluntary disclosure of intangible resources and stock profitability 10 
C.B. Macagnan 
 
The other resources were used for building up the dependent variables: effective 
profitability of stock in 2003; and control variables: the value of the capitalization, 
beta and the result of the accounting value, divided by the price of the stock, in 
2003. 
Analysis technique 
The technique chosen is that of logistic regression, with the profitability of stock in 
2003 (Rentadic3) as the dependent variable. 
The explaining variables (Dtri2; Dcr2; Dce2; Dch2; Dcet2; Dceo2; Dcrn2 and 
Dcrs2), represent the extent of information disclosure measured from the index of 
a category or subcategory of indicators, representing intangible resources, 
disclosed in the annual report of 2002, as seen below in more detail. 
The models are also composed by control variables. Based on the review of 
research done on the implications of disclosure, three control variables have been 
chosen to be included in the models. Those are: (1) the company’s beta for 2003 
(Beta3), representing investment risk for that year; (2) the value of capitalization 
in 2003 (Capital3), since stock profitability may be influenced by the size of the 
company; and (3) the results of the accounting value divided by the price of stock, 
in 2003 (Valor3), indicating the proportion between the capital owned by the 
company and its value on the market. 
Dependent variable 
Dependent variable Rentadic3 identifies the profitability of company stock, 
obtained in 2003. The values are obtained through the calculation of the difference 
between the final value of the stock and its initial value, in 2003, plus the dividend 
and the preference rights for subscription, acquired in the same year. 
(Pjt1 – Pjt0) + (D + DPS) 
                               R jt1 = 
                                                            Pjt0 
 
Equation 1: The profitability of company stock 
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This variable may be described as dichotomous, classifying companies based on 
the following criteria: (1) those which obtain profitability in the year in question, 
which is greater than the average of the sampling and (2) those which obtain 
profitability in the year in question, which is smaller than the average of the 
company sampling. Those with values over the average have the fixed value of 
(1); those with values below average have the fixed value of (0). 
Disclosure index of intangible resources 
For the configuration of the explaining variables, some critical factors have been 
found. The first refers to the nature of the intangible resources that are not defined 
by materiality, but rather by knowledge and information. Moreover, since there is 
no accounting normative to guide the recognition and treatment of all the 
intangibles as assets, even though they represent economic resources owned by 
the companies, creating an objective difficulty of recognition and measurement of 
intangible resources. Accounting norms from the International Accounting Standard 
Committee (IASC – a NIC 38) and from the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB), paragraph 9 from statement number 17; Accounting Principles Board 
(APB), guiding the accounting treatment of immaterial resources as assets with 
limitations. Those are intangible resources which integrate the difference between 
the accounting value and the price of stock on the market. 
Another critical factor for the development of this research was the fact that 
disclosure is an abstract concept and cannot be directly measured, since it does not 
have the characteristics inherent to the determination of its intensity or quality. 
Those difficulties led us to perform two different kinds of literature review: (1) one 
enabling us to recognize intangible resources and (2) different ways of measuring 
the extent of voluntarily disclosed information. Concerning the first difficulty, the 
reviewed theoretical and empirical literature about disclosure recognizes intangible 
resources through representative indicators. Important to highlight that there is 
not appear a generally accepted classification of the intangible (Cañibano et al., 
2000). 
As for the second difficulty, empirical research makes use of indexes, representing 
categories of information indicators, in order to measure their disclosure extent. 
Those are known as the most frequently used and accepted instrument to measure 
the extent of disclosure in the reviewed empirical research projects (Botosan, 
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1997; Garcia-Meca & Martínez, 2004). Some research projects make use of 
indicators and indexes of information obtained from databases, constructed by 
organizations such as the Association for Investment Management and Research 
(AMIR), among others. When there are no indicators or indexes available though 
databases, as in the present research project, those are constructed by the 
researchers themselves. The indicators are enunciated as representing the 
information that one wishes to analyze, and the index is constructed based on a 
selection of information, through categories, making it possible to obtain an 
average of the extent of disclosure. 
There are no indicators of intangible resources and indexes representing the extent 
of disclosure, in the annual reports of companies in the capital market of Spain. So, 
the construction of indicators has been developed. In order to do so, a recognition 
and identification process of representing indicators of intangible resources has 
been established, validated through theoretical and empirical literature, allowing us 
to observe the existence of great variety, both in form and in content, among the 
reviewed studies. After that, a quantitative analysis process has been developed, 
making use of the technique of semiotic analysis, aiming at identifying the 
signification of each indicator pointed out by the literature. This analysis allowed us 
to recognize the indicators, comprising the representation of the whole contents of 
the analysis, representing the intangible resources. Then, those indicators were 
contrasted, in a sampling of thirteen annual reports, aiming at obtaining an 
empirical reference from them. Moreover, factorial analysis has been developed, 
aiming at examining the underlying structure of this set of indicators and 
condensing the information obtained in this way. The results of the analysis did not 
allow us to find common factors between indicators. Thus the existence has been 
confirmed of 123 representing indicators of intangible resources, to be used in the 
present research project, listed in Appendix 2. 
One of the aspects of the criticism that may be opposed to the use of an index for 
the analysis of the extent of information disclosure is that it lacks objectivity, 
especially when constructed by the researchers themselves. This problem is even 
more serious if one is dealing with voluntarily disclosed information. If, on the one 
hand, those limitations have to be recognized, it is also important to bear in mind 
that the indexes, as well as the indicators, have been widely accepted, inasmuch as 
they make a contribution as useful tools for the cognition of a reality that can only 
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be approached through representation (Sveiby, 2000). One of the main advantages 
of the use of indexes is that it allows us to make use of statistical techniques 
(Botosan, 1997). 
Taking into consideration the aforementioned qualifications, some procedures have 
been adopted, in constructing the indexes, such as that of reviewing the theoretical 
and the empirical literature about categories of intangible resources, allowing us to 
recognize and elaborate indexes that represent the indicators. This review made it 
possible to verify the existence of a wide variety, both in form and content, of the 
representational categories of indicators concerning intangible resources. Again, 
the semiotic analysis has been developed aiming at identifying the content of those 
categories, representing the diversity of indicators related to intangible resources, 
which then become indexes. 
1. Total intangible 
resources  
(123 indicators) 
2. Human capital 
(30 indicators) 
3. Structural capital  
(43 indicators) 
6. Relational capital 
 (50 indicators) 
4. Technology-related 
structural capital 
(23 indicators) 
5. Organizational 
structural capital 
(20 indicators) 
7. Business-related 
relational capital  
(42 indicators) 
8. Social relational 
capital 
(8 indicators) 
 
Figure 2: Categories and subcategories, with the number of indicators representing 
intangible resources 
Category (1), total of intangible resources, has a total of 123 indicators, integrating 
three other categories: human capital, structural capital and relational capital 
(Sánchez et al. 2000). Category (2), human capital “is defined as the knowledge 
that employees take with them when they leave the firm. It includes the 
knowledge, skills, experiences and abilities of people” (Cañibano et al., 2002: 63) 
and this research comprises 30 indicators. Category (3), structural capital “is 
defined as the knowledge that stays within the firm at the end of the working day. 
It comprises the organizational routines, procedures, systems, cultures, 
databases,etc.” (Cañibano et al., 2002:63), adding up to a total of 43 indicators. 
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Subcategory (4), technology-related structural capital, represents the company’s 
technological values, and comprises 23 indicators, which are an essential part of 
the company’s structural capital. Subcategory (5), organizational structural capital, 
represents the management system, as well as all the technical and organizational 
activity implemented by the personnel; it comprises 20 indicators. Category (6), 
relational capital, “is defined as all resources linked to the external relationships of 
the firm, with customers, suppliers or R&D partners. It comprises that part of 
Human and Structural Capital involved with the company’s relations with 
stakeholders (investors, creditors, customers, suppliers, etc.), plus the perceptions 
that they hold about the company” (Cañibano et al., 2002: 63), totaling 50 
indicators. Subcategory (7), business-related relational capital, represents the 
values established by the ability to interact with the market, including 42 
indicators, which are an essential part of the company’s relational capital. 
Subcategory (8), social relational capital, comprises 8 different indicators, which 
also form an essential part of the company’s relational capital. 
Validity of extent indexes for disclosure of intangible resources 
The categories and subcategories described above are transformed into 
representative indexes to indicate the extent to which intangible resources 
indicators have been disclosed. Therefore, for each indicator comprising the 
respective category, the value of (1) has been determined when information is 
disclosed and (0) when it is not. This criterion may be challenged if it is considered 
that the disclosed information may have different values in different cases. For this 
reason, some studies make use of weighted criteria, established by the researcher, 
by analysts or through other means. Most empirical studies do not make use of a 
weighted system (Leventis & Weetman, 2000). Prencipe’s research (2004), which 
studies this aspect, obtains similar results for weighted and non-weighted 
indicators. Therefore, the use of a weighted system has been put aside, following 
the methodology used by Cooke (1989, 1992), Wagenhofer (1990), Hossain et al. 
(1995), García and Monterrey (1993), Raffournier (1995), Apellániz and Sardoya 
(1995), Williams (2001) and Gómez et al. (2006). 
The calculus used to elaborate each information disclosure index takes the 
following form: the number of expected indicators for each company corresponds 
to nj, the company is represented by subindex j, and the number of indicators is 
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expressed by i. When the indicator Xij is revealed, it receives the value of 1, and 0 
if it is not revealed. 
j
n
i
ij
j n
x
I

 1  j
n
i
ij
jI 1  
 
Equation 2: Disclosure index 
Another point that must be emphasized is the difference between the absence of 
an indicator and its non-disclosure. On the one hand, one may have a case where 
the indicator is irrelevant to the company, as in the example of a company that 
sells an extremely large number of products, for which their individual price is not 
considered an important piece of information (e.g. Carrefour). On the other hand, 
the question arises whether the company discloses such information (or not). Such 
situations were taken into consideration and indexes were constructed that were 
adjusted to each individual case. The total value of a company’s indicators was 
calculated, divided by the maximum number that could be obtained, and multiplied 
that by 100. The obtained variation goes from 0 to 100 of the result of the 
constructed index. Subsequently, those indicators and indexes were submitted to a 
validation process by five researchers in the field, based on a procedure used by 
Macagnan (2005). 
Variables  Cronbach’s Alfa 
Total intangible resources 0.938 
Human capital 0.818 
Structural capital 0.892 
Technology-related structural capital 0.826 
Organizational structural capital 0.796 
Relational capital 0.868 
Business-related relational capital 0.859 
Social relational capital 0.798 
  
Table 1: Cronbach’s Alfa statistics of disclosure indexes – explaining variables 
Cronbach’s Alfa test was applied, aiming at measuring the internal coherence of 
the constructed indexes, which indicates the trustworthiness of such 
measurements when many items are used, as in this study. Values below 0.7 
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Variables N Average Typical 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Dtri2 (Total intangib le resources*) 91 25.78 12.97 4.07 60.16 
Dcr2 (Relational cap ital*) 91 29.75 16.96 0.00 79.07 
Dce2 (Structural capital*) 91 26.53 14.23 2.00 70.00 
Dch2 (Human capital*) 91 18.86 13.38 0.00 56.67 
Dcet2 (Technology-related structural capital*) 91 29.79 17.08 0.00 82.61 
Dceo2 (Organizational structural capital*) 91 26.70 17.72 0.00 75.00 
Dcrn2 (Business-related relational capital*) 91 23.02 13.93 2.38 66.67 
Dcrs2 (Social relational capital*) 91 44.92 31.89 0.00 100.00 
Valor3 (accounting value divided by stock price**) 91 0.78 0.92 0.00 5.95 
Logvalor3 (logarithm accounting value divided by stock price**) 91 0.12 0.45 -0.69 1.86 
Capital3 (capitalization**) 91 3119195 7698092 13379 57686575 
Logcapital3 (logarithm capitalization**) 91 13.39 1.85 9.50 17.87 
Beta3 (Beta**) 80 0.25*** 0.24 -0.17 0.86 
* Values for 2002 
** Values for 2003 
*** The companies with higher liquidity were those that 
integrate IBEX 35; however, the majority of companies in the 
sampling have low liquidity, which helps explain the Beta 
average. 
     
generally indicate low internal consistency. The results obtained in this research 
are presented in Table 1, where one may observe the existence of internal 
coherence in the constructed indexes. 
4. Analysis of empirical results 
Descriptive analysis  
 
 
 
Table 2: Statistics describing indexes representing the extent of disclosure of information 
related to intangible resources (explaining variables) and control variables. 
The results of the descriptive analysis are presented in Table 2, where it is shown 
that the highest average is that of the variable representing the social capital 
(Dcrs2), with 44.92% of disclosed indicators. On the other hand, the lowest 
average is that of human capital (Dch2), with 18.86% of disclosed indicators. The 
control variable of human capital (Capital3) presents a deviation typically higher 
than the average, which led us to transform it into logarithms. Since the control 
variable of accounting value divided by stock value (Valor3) did not range below 
average when transformed into logarithms, the choice has been made to make use 
of it without the transformation. 
Appendix 1 shows percentages of indicators of intangible resources disclosed in the 
2002 annual report; there, the most frequently disclosed indicators are: (1) those 
representing the number of employees, with 89.4%; and (2) the characteristics of 
provided products, with 88.3%.  
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Analysis of correlations 
Table 3 shows the explanatory variables: total of intangible resources (Dtai2), 
Relational capital (Dcr2), Structural capital (Dce2), Technology-related structural 
capital (Dcet2) and Organizational structural capital (Dceo2), which represent the 
extent of indicator disclosure on intangible resources, with correlation coefficients 
compromising the inclusion of those into the same regression model.  
 Dtri2 Dcr2 Dce2 Dch2 Dcet2 Dceo2 Dcrn2 Dcrs2 Valor3 Beta3 Logcapital3 
Dtri2 1           
Dcr2 .891** 1          
Dce2 .896** .660** 1         
Dch2 .767** .554** .587** 1        
Dcet2 .891** 1.000** .660** .554** 1       
Dceo2 .847** .921** .649** .541** .921** 1      
Dcrn2 .806** .575** .941** .491** .575** .584** 1     
Dcrs2 .649** .523** .630** .511** .523** .470** .330** 1    
Valor3 -0.13 -0.134 -0.129 -0.043 -0.134 -0.124 -0.192 0.082 1   
Beta3 0.217 0.151 0.203 .228* 0.151 0.175 .258* -0.027 0.008 1  
Logcapital3 .404** .260* .454** .330** .258* .252* .475** 0.178 -.397** .274* 1  
** The correlation is significant at level 0.01 bilateral. 
* The correlation is significant at level 0.05 bilateral. 
Table 3: Correlations between explanatory and control variables 
Therefore, the inclusion of one of those explaining variables into the model results 
in the need to exclude others, since they are correlated. On the other hand, the 
majority of the control variables, Valor3 and Beta3, do not have considerable 
correlation coefficients. The variable logcapital3 is correlated with almost all 
explanatory variables, but the coefficients are relatively acceptable. 
Logistic regression analysis 
Through the many different models of logistic regression analysis, it was possible 
to identify statistically significant results, indicating the probability of implication of 
stock profitability, in the year following the disclosure of information, according to 
each category of intangible resources. In none of the statistically significant models 
has Capital3, the variable indicating the level of capitalization, been confirmed, as 
shown below. 
Model 1: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dtri2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
The explanatory variable, representing the extent of disclosure of the total of 
intangible resources, shows the value of LR statistic (maximum verisimilitude) of 
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13.22554, at 1% of significance, with all the statistically significant variables. This 
indicates that there is the probability of implication between the extension of total 
disclosure of intangible resources, in 2002, and the profitability of stock, in the 
following year. Furthermore, a higher Beta value for one given company increases 
the probability of greater stock profitability as compared to the set’s average. It 
also implies that there is a probability that increased results for the accounting 
value divided by the price of stock will cause a decrease of its profitability.  
Model 1 Dependent Variable: Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1  
Obs with Dep=0    
36  
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 4: Disclosure of total of intangible resources 
Differences between the reviewed body of works and the present study 
notwithstanding, Botosan’s (1997) research is especially relevant, which, analyzing 
122 manufacturing companies, with stock in the American market, shows that the 
extent of information disclosure, with a low level of analysis by researchers, is 
negatively related to capital costs, with a coefficient of R2 16.5% of explanation. 
However, when the level of analysis by researchers is higher, the results do not 
indicate a statistically significant relationship between the extent of information 
disclosure and the cost of capital for the liquid assets. 
In another study, Botosan and Plumlee (2001) have shown that the extent of 
disclosure in the annual report reduces the cost of capital, with a statistically 
significant model at R2 6.26%. On the other hand, Richard and Welker (2001) have 
shown that extent of disclosure concerning financial information reduces the cost of 
capital, at R2 8.4%. Hail (2002) confirms these findings, establishing that the 
extent of disclosure in the annual reports of Swiss companies is negatively related 
to the cost of capital, with an explanatory coefficient of R2 38.1%. 
Gietzmann and Ireland (2003) studied the relationship between the extent of 
disclosure of financial information and the cost of capital. The results have shown 
that companies from the United Kingdom, known for their aggressiveness in the 
market, have reduced their costs by increasing the extent of disclosure. However, 
Explaining Variables  Coefficient Prob. 
McFadden 
R-squared 
Beta3 2.167007 0.0503 0.120121 
Valor3 -1.495014 0.0283  
Dtri2 -0.033431 0.0848  
LR statistic (3 df) 13.22554 Probability (LR statu)      0.004173  
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when companies are conservative, there has been no ratified relationship between 
the disclosure of information and the cost of capital. 
With different results, Espinosa and Trombetta (2004) have not ratified a clear 
inverse relationship between the extent of disclosure and the cost of capital, when 
they analyzed a sampling of companies of the Spanish market. With similar results, 
Alencar and Lopes (2005) were unable to confirm that the degree of eligibility to 
the Transparency Prize – which represents the extent of disclosure of Brazilian 
companies – has any influence in the cost of capital. 
Model 2: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dce2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
As above, Model 2 shows an LR statistic of 15.08351, at 1% of signification, 
presenting statistically significant variables, indicating the probability of implication 
between the profitability of company stock, in the year following disclosure of 
information on structural capital (Dce2). There is also the probability of implication 
with the Beta and the accounting value of stock / price. The three variables present 
a level of significance lower than 5%. In this sense, the model shows the 
probability of a relationship between the extent of disclosure of information on 
structural capital, in 2002, and the profitability of company stock in the following 
year. 
Model 2 Dependent Variable: Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 5: Disclosure of information on structural capital 
In this sense, the model shows that there is the probability of a relationship 
between the extent of disclosure on structural capital, in 2002, and the profitability 
of stock in the following year. 
Model 3: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dcr2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
 
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 2.266854 0.0409 0.136996 
Valor3 -1.495313 0.0292  
Dce2 -0.038711 0.0329  
LR statistic (3 df) 15.08351 
Probability (LR statu)   
0.001747 
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Model 3 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 6: Disclosure of information on relational capital 
Model 3 shows that control variables Beta3 and Valor3 are statistically significant, 
and LR statistic 12.55988, at 10% significance. It does not show that Dcr2 
(relational capital disclosure) is statistically relevant. Therefore, there is no 
probability of relationship between the explaining variable Dcr2 and the dependent 
variable. 
In other words, there is no probability that the greater the extent of disclosure on 
relational capital, there will be either lesser or greater profitability of stock in the 
following year. 
Model 4: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dch2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
Model 4 presents LR statistic 10.09994, at 1% significance. The coefficient Beta3 
associated with the variable Valor3 is lower than 0.05, but all the other coefficients 
are close to this limit. It demonstrates that the variables Beta3 and Valor3 are 
statistically significant. However, it does not show that the variable Rch2 
(disclosure of Human capital) is statistically significant. The model does not show 
the probability of there being a relationship between the variable Rch2 and the 
dependent variable Rentadic3. 
Model 4 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 7: Disclosure of information on human capital 
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 1.985751 0.0666 0.114075 
Valor3 -1.531904 0.0260  
Dcr2 -0.022365 0.1247  
LR statistic (3 df) 12.55988 Probability (LR stat) 0.005692  
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 1.696620 0.1127 0.091732 
Valor3 -1.447629 0.0320  
Dch2 -0.003032 0.8658  
LR statistic (3 df) 10.09994 Probability (LR statu) 0.017735  
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Table 7: Disclosure of information on human capital Therefore, one does not 
observe a probability of there being greater stock profitability in the following year 
for a greater disclosure of information on human capital. 
Model 5: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dcet2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
Model 5 is validated, with LR statistic of 12.60049, at an admissible level of 
significance. The variables Beta3 and Valor3 present a level of significance around 
5%. The model does not show that the variable Dcet2 (extent of disclosure on 
Technology-related structural capital) is statistically relevant. 
Model 5 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 8: Disclosure of information on technology-related structural capital 
The model does not identify a statistically significant probability of there being a 
relationship between the variable representing the extent of disclosure on 
technology-related structural capital and the profitability in the following year. 
Model 6: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dceo2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
Model 6 of logistic regression, identified in Table 9, shows that variables are 
statistically significant, with LR statistic 11.93551, at 1% significance. The variable 
Valor3 is statistically significant at 5%, whereas variable Beta3, is found to have 
10% significance. On the other hand, the model does not show that the variable 
Dceo2 (disclosure of organizational structural capital) has statistically significant 
values. 
Model 6 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 9: Disclosure of information on structural capital 
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 1.988378 0.0663 0.114444 
Valor3 -1.531875 0.0260  
Dcet2 -0.022402 0.1222  
LR statistic (3 df) 12.60049 Probability (LR statu) 0.005585  
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 1.967616 0.0693 0.108404 
Valor3 -1.512969 0.0274  
Dceo2 -0.018550 0.1799  
LR statistic (3 df) 11.93551 Probability (LR statu) 0.007607  
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Therefore, one does not observe a probability of there being greater stock 
profitability in the following year for a greater disclosure of information on 
organizational structural capital. 
Model 7: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dcrn2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
Model 7 presents logistic regression validated with LR statistic of 14.15035, at 1% 
significance. The variables: Beta3 and Valor 3 are statistically significant at 5% and 
the variable Dcrn2, at 10%. This leads us to recognize the probability of there 
being a decrease in stock profitability in the following year for a greater disclosure 
of information on business-related relational capital. 
Model 7 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 10: Disclosure of information on Business-related relational capital 
Model 8: Rentadic3 = β0 + β1Dcrs2 + β2 Beta3 + β3 Capital3 + β4 Valor3 + ε 
Model 8 is validated with LR statistic 13.06016, at 1% significance. The model 
shows that the variables Beta3, Valor3 and Dcrs2 are statistically significant at 
10%. This allows us to recognize the probability of greater stock profitability for 
greater extent in disclosure of information on social relational capital. Regardless of 
differences in the nature of our study, the results confirm the findings of Richard 
and Welker (2001), who validated a model indicating a relationship between the 
disclosure of social information and the cost of capital, at a coefficient R2 9.9%. 
Model 8 
Dependent Variable: 
Rentadic3 
Obs with Dep=1 
Obs with Dep=0 
36 
44 
Total obs 80 
Table 11: Disclosure of information on social relational capital 
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 2.323017 0.0402 0.128520 
Valor3 -1.613481 0.0214  
Dcrn2 -0.036225 0.0529  
LR statistic (3 df) 14.15035 
Probability (LR 
statu)0.002707 
 
Explaining Variables Coefficient Prob. McFadden R-squared 
Beta3 1.711941 0.1024 0.118619 
Valor3 -1.253821 0.0606  
Dcrs2 -0.013179 0.0883  
LR statistic (3 df) 13.06016 
Probability (LR 
statu)0.004508 
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Considering these statistical results, the hypothesis may be accepted that there is 
the probability of a relationship between the extent of information disclosure on 
intangible resources and the profitability of stock, for companies which have 
obtained results above sample average, in the following year. The explanatory 
relationship is negative, i.e. there is the probability, albeit low, of lesser gains 
associated to greater extent in disclosure. In this sense, disclosing intangible 
resources may lead to greater costs for the stockholder. The same happens when 
disclosure refers to structural capital, as a category, and to business-related and 
social relational capital, as subcategories. On the other hand, the hypothesis has 
not been confirmed when related to the disclosure of information on human capital, 
relational capital, technology-related structural capital, and organizational capital, 
when those are analyzed individually. 
5. Final considerations 
The present study contributes by providing direct evidence to support the 
hypothesis that there is a connection between the extent of information disclosure 
on intangible resources and the profitability of stock in the following year, for 
companies obtaining results above sample average. The results are relevant, 
considering that profitability may be explained by other variables. 
The empirical results of the present study do not support the assumption that, for 
capital markets, the absence of information is bad information (Lev, 2003). This is 
due to the fact that, somehow, the decision to disclose information on intangible 
resources may lead to lower profitability levels, whether due to negative appraisals 
by investors, or because investors find that the stock is overpriced. Taking into 
account the fact that investments on intangible resources are generally very 
expensive, in the first stages of a process of innovation, as well as the risk 
associated to their technological and commercial viability (Lev, 2003), one may 
consider that there is the probability that investors, to a certain extent, do not 
appreciate risks, when it comes to this kind of information. 
It is important to remember that the present study is different from other reviewed 
research projects in two basic aspects. First, the reviewed studies analyze the cost 
of capital, an ex-ante perspective, whereas our research project analyzes stock 
profitability (ex-post). The second point refers to the variables that represent the 
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disclosure of information. In all reviewed studies, the analyzed information did not 
concern intangible resources, as in our case. Intangible resources may be a 
competitive advantage for the company. This difference is essential when one 
wishes to identify the assumptions upon which the problematic of disclosure is 
based, which, on the one hand, considers that disclosing information may reduce 
the costs of a transaction, but which, on the other hand, would lead to extra costs 
for the owner. 
The results of this research lead to think that the market may give a positive value, 
not to the amount of disclosed information on intangible resources, but rather to 
the impact of an intangible resource on a market “reality”. In this sense, the extent 
of this research would refer to the use of other methodological perspectives. It is 
also important to replicate the present study upon companies from other markets, 
since the present study is limited to the Spanish market. A sampling of companies 
from stock markets with a greater number of actors, or in different countries, 
would allow us to identify the specificities of different markets. 
Although the obtained results are not described, the present study also analyzed 
the impact of disclosure in the year 2002 over the profitability of stock in 2004. 
The same methodology was adopted for calculating profitability, and the same data 
sources were used. The variation from the presented models was limited to values 
of the dependent variable and of the control variables, corresponding to the year 
2004, whereas the values of the explanatory variables were kept the same, related 
to the year 2002. The models did not present statistically significant results, in any 
of these cases. This led us to conclude that there is no impact of disclosure in 2002 
over profitability in 2004. Therefore, considering the possibility of a variation of the 
implication of information disclosure over the profitability of stock, it would be 
convenient to analyze the greater sampling in terms of years, which would lead to 
a greater understanding about the sensitivity of the market to the variation in the 
extent of voluntary information disclosure, especially concerning intangible 
resources. 
Finally, it is important to expand the present study to encompass other data 
sources, such as the specialized press, meetings with analysts, and the company’s 
page on the Internet, among other communication channels, although the annual 
report remains the main official channel between the direction of a company and 
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the market, besides being the most frequent object of study in empirical research. 
However, the market may make use of other channels disclosing information on 
intangible resources. The present study, along with all other similar studies, does 
not take into consideration the intangible passives. If this information were to be 
analyzed, a wider perspective could be obtained about the probability of implication 
between the extent of information disclosure and the stock profitability in the 
following year, since the resources and the disclosure of intangible passives may 
influence the profitability of company stock. 
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Appendix 1: Companies in the sampling 
Abengoa  Cementos Molins  Española Del Zinc  Urbis  Sol Meliá 
Abertis  Cementos Portland Europistas  Jazz Telecom  SOS 
Acciona  Carrefour  FCC  La Seda  Tecnocom  
Aceralia  Cia Diretores Logista  Funespana  Metrovacesa  Telefónica Moviles  
Acerinox  CEP Gamesa CT  MS Ponferrada Telefónica PI  
ACS  Cia EVA Gas Natural SDG NH  Telefónica  
Adolfo Dominguez  CLH ENCE  Obrascon  Telepizza  
Aguas de Valencia  CAF Ferrovial  PC de Europa  Testa  
Aldeasa  Cortef iel Inmocaral  Prisa Transp. Azkar  
Altadis  Dogi Hullas  Prosegur  Tubacex  
Amadeus Dragados Iberdrola  Puleva Biotech  Tubos Reunidos  
Amper  Duro Felguera Iberia  Recoletos Union Fenosa  
Arcelor  EADS Iberpapel  REE  Unipapel  
Azkoyen  Ebro Puleva  Indo  Repsol YPF  Uralita  
Baron de Ley  Elecnor  Indra  S.A. Hullera  Vidrala  
Befesa Enagas  Ind Diseno Textil  Sacyr  Viscofan 
Bodegas Riojanas  Endesa  Colonial  SPS  Zardoya Otis  
Campofrio  EI Aragonesas   Del Sur  AGBAR Zeltia 
Cementos Lemona Ercros    
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Appendix 2: Categories and subcategories, with their respective indicators 
representing intangible resources 
Category  of H UMAN  CAPITAL  indicators %  
N umber of employees 89.4 
Evolut ion of the number of employees in recent  years 47.9 
N umber of layoffs 12.8 
N umber of newly hired employees 21.3 
N umber of m issed workdays         11.7 
External mobility of personn el 44.7 
Internal mobility of person nel 16.0 
Seniority  seg mentation of personnel                      11.7 
Function segmentat ion  of personne l 8.5 
Age segmentat ion of personnel 21.3 
Ed ucat ional leve l segmentat ion of personne l  0.0 
Gender segmentation of personnel  6.4 
Regional segmentat ion of personne l                  6.4 
Descrip tion of tra ining and educat ional act iv ities 7.4 
H ours spent on training and ed ucat ional act iv ities 54.3 
Expenditure on trainin g an d educational activ it ies 36.2 
Emp loyees that took part in tra ining or educational activ ities 11.7 
Recruiting policies 39.4 
Salary policy  and system 10.6 
Career plan 5.3 
Incentive program 7.4 
Socia l benefits an d programs 8.5 
Security  and hygiene-re lated policies 14.9 
Information about agreements w ith un ion s 39.4 
Emp loyees’ leve l of satisfact ion 10.6 
Productiv ity or profi tability  per employee 2.1 
Earnings per emp loyee 4.3 
Work experience of main directors in  other companies 2.1 
Training of main directors 4.3 
N ewly hired directors 0.0 
Category  of STRU CTU RAL  CAPITAL indicators = (Technology-re lated structural capita l +  
Organizational structural capital)  %  
Subcategory of TECH NOLOGY-RE LATED STRUCTURAL CAPITAL indicators  
Descrip tion and reasons for investment on information techn olog ies 20.2 
Descrip tion of investments on hardw are 8.5 
Cost of investments on hardware 4.3 
Descrip tion of investments on software 17.0 
Cost of investments on software 6.4 
Policy , strategy and / or object ives of I+D  act ivit ies 45.7 
Competit ive force of I+D  act iv ities compared to competitors 40.4 
Futu re perspect ives related to I+D  45.7 
Expenditure on I+D  33.0 
N umber of employees involved in I+D  5.3 
N umber of patents, licen ses, etc. 12.8 
Pending patents, licenses, etc.  7.4 
Deta ils on patents or licenses 12.8 
N ew prod ucts 51.1 
Projects or products under development 58.5 
Prices of marketed products 10.6 
Phase of product lifecycle 40.4 
Characteristics of offered p roducts 88.3 
Indicators of prod uct ive efficiency 61.7 
Indicator of the state of th e production  tech nology used  62.8 
Installed capacity  30.9 
U sed capacity  30.9 
Image of brand(s) 40.4 
Category  of ORGAN IZATIONAL STRU CTURAL CAPITAL  indicators %  
N umbers in dicat ing th e level of informatization (number of computers, etc.) 9.6 
Data on information systems (databases, number of people  with  computer access, etc.) 17.0 
Personne l d evoted to information technologies 2.1 
Improvements adopted in processes and in organization  for the period in question 68.1 
Costs of improvements adopted in processes or in organization 36.2 
Reason s for investment on information processes 51.1 
M anag ement and control systems ad opted 39.4 
N umbers concerning the distribu tion and / or organization of work  time 0.0 
H ome w ork 3.2 
Declarat ion of organizational culture 17.0 
Policy  of internal commun icat ion 17.0 
Organizational structure / company’s organizational chart  54.3 
Company ’s history and evolu tion 46.8 
Basic strategic guide lines 53.2 
Competit ive posit ion  in the sector 36.2 
Trends in th e sector 23.4 
Comments on entry  barriers 7.4 
Comments on threats from  competitors 1.1 
Comments on technological advantag es 21.3 
Acquisit ions 18.1 
Categories of RELATIONAL CAPITAL indicators =  Business-re lated re lational capita l +  Social %   
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